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INTRODUCTION

The "new" Juvenile Act of 1972' is no longer so new, but a number
of problems remain that are of concern to lawyers, judges, administrators, and others involved in the field of juvenile justice. This
writing is designed to update an initial review of the Act published
in a previous volume of the Duquesne Law Review2 and will concentrate on the practical aspects of working within the confines of the
legislation.3 The first article was written after the Act had been in
effect for only a few months. Grounded in the experience of working
with the legislation during that brief time, the 1973 article made a
number of predictions concerning the operation of particular provisions of the Act. Some of these predictions have become realities;
this will be seen through an examination of case law and an overview of present standards and conditions. What perhaps is more
significant is that a number of key questions that were open in 1973
remain unanswered in 1977.
II.
A.

THE ACT

Its Purposes

article,4

As noted in the 1973
two differing philosophies are placed
in juxtaposition when dealing with problems of delinquency. The
first can be described as the "social worker" philosophy. This approach stresses deinstitutionalization and community-based treatment of the individual child, hopefully, in the home. The second
approach can be labeled the "law enforcement" philosophy. It
points to the serious nature of juvenile crime and emphasizes the
need for secure facilities to restrain violent youths treated within the
juvenile justice system.
The divergence between the two philosophies has not abated since
the implementation of the Act, but, in fact, has developed into an
open split with the appointment of Jerome G. Miller as Pennsyl1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 to -103, -201, -301 to -337 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
2. Klein, A Practical Look at the New Juvenile Act, 12 DUQ. L. REv. 186 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Klein].
3. The writer would like to especially thank the following for their assistance: Lewis P.
Mitrano, Chief of the Family Court Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office;
Joseph M. Casey, Chief, Family Court Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia;
and Leonard Packel, Associate Professor, Villanova University School of Law.
4. Klein, supra note 2, at 187.
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vania's Commissioner of Children and Youth. Dr. Miller advocates
the "social worker" approach to the juvenile justice system, and his
desire to assume responsibility for placement of committed juveniles has generated open conflict with judges assigned to juvenile
court.' Because the different approaches remain, the practical problems that arise in working within the Act are not always resolved
consistently; sometimes one philosophy prevails, sometimes the
other.
B.

Pre-trialDetention

1. Preventive Detention
Under section 12 of the Juvenile Act,' preventive detention of
juveniles is permitted when a determination is made that there is a
risk to the community from the juvenile. It was anticipated that
there might be difficulty in obtaining appellate court review of the
constitutionality of this provision, because the point often becomes
moot when the juvenile is tried or released before an appeal can be
perfected To date, the issue has not been specifically litigated in
the appellate courts. However, if the experience under an analogous
provision-section 18(a), which deals with maximum allowable detention before a hearing'-can be used as a guide, it is likely the
superior court will, indeed, consider the issue moot by the time the
case reaches that stage of the appellate process.'
5. Although the split between the welfare department and the judges is well known to
many working in the juvenile justice system, much of the information coming to this writer
has come in confidential conversations or "off the record" meetings. Suffice it to say that at
this time it appears that the judges are retaining the power to place juveniles in specific
institutions within the Commonwealth while steps are being taken through the welfare department to create more facilities that are less penal in nature.
6. This section provides:
Detention of Child
A child taken into custody shall not be detained or placed in shelter care prior to
the hearing on the petition unless his detention or care is required to protect the person
or property of others or of the child or because the child may abscond or be removed
from the jurisdiction of the court or because he has no parent, guardian, or custodian
or other person able to provide supervision and care for him and return him to the court
when required, or an order for his detention or shelter care has been made by the court
pursuant to this act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-309 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
7. Klein, supra note 2, at 192.
8. See text accompanying notes 12-15 infra.
9. See text accompanying note 13 infra.

Duquesne Law Review

2.

Vol. 15: 427

How Long a Juvenile May Be Held

Section 18(a) of the 1972 Act originally provided:
After the petition has been filed the court shall fix a time for
hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not
be later than ten days after the filing of the petition. If the
hearing is not held within such time, the child shall be immediately released from detention. . .. 1"
Since no provision for continuance was provided by the legislature,
it can be argued that a release was mandatory whenever a hearing
could not be held within ten days, even if the Commonwealth was
not responsible for the delay. However, where, for example, the
victim of a juvenile's attack is still hospitalized and unable to appear at a detention hearing, or where no adult is willing to take
custody of the child, the legislation's mandate for a hearing within
ten days has been ignored by the courts." The question that arose
was whether a court had the authority to grant such continuances.
One case testing the constitutionality of detentions beyond the
ten-day period has reached the appellate level. In Commonwealth
ex rel. Watson v. Montone,'2 the Commonwealth was granted a
continuance in regard to a detention hearing of two juveniles. Since
the continuance delayed the adjudicatory hearing beyond the tenday period mandated by section 18, counsel for the juveniles sought
their immediate release, first by oral writ and then by petitions for
writs of habeas corpus. When both requests were denied, counsel
requested a supersedeas from the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Before the court could act upon the request, one of the juveniles was
released and the other was detained on other charges. On appeal,
the superior court refused jurisdiction because an actual controversy
no longer existed.The court noted that the only circumstances under
which a moot case would be decided were those where exceptional
circumstances existed or where the question raised was necessarily
a recurring one;' 3 neither circumstance existed in the instant case.'"
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
11. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 2, at 193.
12. 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 541, 323 A.2d 763 (1974).
13. Id. at 544-45, 323 A.2d at 765.
14. On the issue of whether the moot question was a recurring one, the court disregarded
a letter to it from the Defender Association of Philadelphia, which gave examples of a continuing pattern of disregard for the ten-day rule. The court rejected the letter because the facts

1977

Juvenile Act

While it admitted that the speed with which juvenile cases are
handled may mean that the issue of detention beyond the specified
ten-day period may never be properly presented by appeal, the
court pointed out that it did not necessarily follow that the court
would never be able to decide the issue. The superior court indicated
that the use of writs of mandamus and prohibition would be the
proper remedy when a trial judge disregarded the ten-day rule.,5
When writs have been filed, there generally has been prompt action,
at least in Philadelphia where there are chambers of superior court
judges. Usually, when the writ is served upon the common pleas
court judge, the release follows quickly. It has been indicated that
even if the victim is hospitalized, a bedside hearing is preferable to
long pre-trial detention."
The legislature adopted this view when it recently amended the
Juvenile Act. 7 The newly enacted amendment modifies the Juvenile Act to allow for an extension of the period of pre-trial detention
for "an additional single period not to exceed ten days" if evidence
was not available, could not have been made available by due diligence, and will be available within the ten days, and there is reason
to believe that the child or the community would be in danger or
the child would leave the jurisdiction. However, it is now clear that
the child must be released after 20 days even if there would be
danger to the child, or the community, or it does seem likely that
the child would abscond.
3.

Where a Juvenile May Be Detained

Section 14(4) of the Juvenile Act of 1972 provides that juveniles
may not be detained with adults unless no appropriate facility is
available. If no juvenile facility is available, a child may be kept in
an adult detention center, but the child must be kept separate from
adults and may be detained for no more than five days." Predictaof the cases reported in the letter were not properly before it and because the letter did not
demonstrate a necessarily recurring question. Id. at 545 n.2, 323 A.2d at 765 n.2.
15. Id. at 546, 323 A.2d at 766.
16. Interview with Joseph M. Casey, Chief, Family Court Division of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, Pa. (July 18, 1977).
17. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -, amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
50-311(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-311 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). This section has been
See notes 25significantly modified by the Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws _.
27 and accompanying text of the Addendum for a discussion of the modification of § 14
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bly, the rule, because of limited juvenile facilities, has not obtained
full compliance. In some instances, the legislation has altered past
practices. For example, in Philadelphia, non-certified juveniles are
housed at the Youth Study Center, rather than in a separate wing
at the adult facility, the House of Correction. Of course, this does
not apply to juveniles transferred for trial in adult court. 9 In Philadelphia suburbs, dangerous children or those considered high escape
risks are still held in adult county jails.2 " The legality of the action
has not been confirmed by appellate court review. Although there
have been some habeas corpus actions brought, these actions have
resulted in transfers of the children to a juvenile detention facility.2
Furthermore, because juvenile cases pass through the system so
quickly, this issue, too, is often moot before appellate review can be
secured.
Section 14(4) of the 1972 Act is demonstrable evidence that it is
much easier for a legislature to vote for a bill that proposes the
desirable end-separate juvenile detention facilities-than it is to
vote for appropriations to transfer that end to a hard reality. The
courts still await funds to establish sufficient reasonable juvenile
detention facilities in order to properly comply with section 14(4).
The 1977 amendments to the Act have once again attempted to
ensure that juveniles are not housed in adult facilities by making it
unlawful after December 31, 1979 to detain juveniles with adults
and by providing for the submission of programs, construction of
facilities, and assessment of some of the costs from the counties.22
through an amendment providing for immediate Public Welfare Department supervision of
facilities used for juvenile detention, prohibiting any mingling of adults and juveniles after
December 31, 1979, and mandating construction of detention facilities.
19. Interview with Stanley M. Hopson, Deputy Administrator for the Juvenile Branch of
the Family Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Feb. 24,
1977). Although most people believe that there has been an increase in transfers to adult court
since the passage of the Juvenile Act of 1972, particularly with the elimination of Camp Hill
as a juvenile resource, statistics indicate a reduction of juvenile detentioners in adult facilities, at least in Philadelphia. During the period from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972, Philadelphia housed 1,437 detentioners under the age of 18. In the 11 month period from July 1, 1975
to May 31, 1976, only 337 detentioners were housed in Philadelphia adult prisons. Interview
with Steven Sacks of the Philadelphia Prisons Research and Development Unit (Aug. 15,
1977). Thus, there appear to be only 25% as many youths under 18 in Philadelphia adult jails
as there were four years before.
20. Packel, A Guide to Pennsylvania Delinquency Law, 21 VILL. L. REv. 1, 36 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Packel].
21. Id.
22. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws , amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
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C.

Jurisdictionof the Court
1. Summary Offenses

As discussed in the 1973 article,2 3 the Juvenile Act of 1972 made
it clear that summary offenses were not considered "delinquent
acts" for the purposes of attaching the jurisdiction of the juvenile
courts.24 The results have been arbitrary and incongruous. A good
example is the case of Gillen Appeal.25 Gillen and a codefendant
were charged with acts of criminal mischief for kicking in the doors
of several cars. Gillen also was charged with possession of a pipe
containing a residue of marijuana. Both minors were adjudged delinquent by juvenile court. But the superior court reversed the judgment against the codefendant on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of damages in excess of $500, the amount of damages
needed to raise the criminal mischief offense from a summary one
to a misdemeanor. Thus, the criminal mischief charge was an insufficient offense upon which to attach an adjudication of delinquency.
The codefendant was granted a new trial. The superior court looked
at Gillen's situation differently because of the marijuana charge to
which he had pleaded guilty. The court held that the possession
conviction was independently sufficient to sustain the court's adjudication of Gillen's delinquency;" The ironic aspect of this decision
was pointed out by Judge Hoffman in a cogent separate opinion.
Judge Hoffman noted that the penalty for possession of minimal
50-311 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 14 (July 13,
1977).
23. Klein, supra note 2, at 197.
24. The 1972 Act defines a "delinquent act" as:
(i) an act designated a crime under the law of this State, or of another state if the
act occurred in that state, or under Federal law, or under local ordinances; or (ii) a
specific act or acts of habitual disobedience of the reasonable and lawful commands
of his parent,guardian, or other custodian committed by a child who is ungovernable.
"Delinquent act" shall not include the crime of murder nor shall it include summary
offenses unless the child fails to pay a fine levied thereunder, in which event notice of
such fact shall be certified to the court.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978) (emphasis added). The italicized
language has been deleted in the 1977 amendment and the following is added to the subsection: "No child shall be detained, committed or sentenced to imprisonment by a district
magistrate, municipal court judge, or traffic court judge." See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's
No. 1201, § 2(2) (July 13, 1977).
25. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 521, 344 A.2d 706 (1975) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 525-26, 344 A.2d at 708. A misdemeanor of the third degree must cause pecuniary loss in excess of $500; otherwise, the crime is a summary offense. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3304(b) (Purdon 1973).
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amounts of marijuana was only thirty days in prison, one-third the
sentence for conviction of a summary offense.27 Therefore, one could
be considered delinquent for committing a less serious act than an
offense for which one could not be considered delinquent. Judge
Hoffman further pointed out that the lower court at least should be
asked to reconsider its ruling to see if it would consider Gillen delinquent for possessing the pipe, absent the misdemeanor charge."
In general, there seems to be little purpose in excluding nonmotor vehicle summary offenses from the Juvenile Act. Since the
omission has caused questionable decisions, like the Gillen case, it
is disappointing that corrective legislation which would have included summary offenses within the jurisdiction of juvenile courts
died of neglect in the House of Representatives.2 9
There is, however, at least one practical problem proffered in
support of the exclusion of summary offenses: the correctional facilities would encounter organizational difficulties as a result of the
shorter, summary offense sentences. Normally, juvenile commitments last from six months to a year,3" and directors of several
institutions have informed this writer that it disrupts the institution
to change the incarceration pattern since various incentive and punishment programs are geared to the customary release dates. Yet
this potential problem might best be overcome by developing special facilities for short-term commitments, rather than by excluding
jurisdiction over summary offenses from juvenile court. Obviously,
this would necessitate appropriations for construction of such facilities, but allowing juvenile courts to handle summary cases should
not be viewed as the sole reason for this added financial burden;
there is already a definite need for a facility available for short-term
commitments for juveniles other than the detention facilities where
there are few opportunities for any rehabilitation. The need for such
a facility was demonstrated when a number of judges used Philadelphia's separate diagnostic unit, located on the grounds of the Youth
Development Center at Cornwells Heights and designed to carry out
27. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. at 528, 344 A.2d at 709-10 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
28. Id. at 529, 344 A.2d at 710.
29. See Pa. Senate Bill 125, Printer's No. 2271, § 14(A)(4) (Jan. 23, 1973). Pennsylvania
appears to be the only state in which summary offenses are not included within the meaning
of delinquent conduct. Packel, supra note 20, at 13. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 of
the Addendum.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-323 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
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sixty-day, in-depth evaluations, for short-term commitments instead of evaluations-not the most economical use of resources.
So-called "status offenses" can trigger the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Although it considerably limits prior law, the Juvenile
Act of 1972 includes under the definition of a "delinquent act" or a
"status offense" "a specific act or acts of habitual disobedience of
the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian, or
other custodian committed by a child who is ungovernable."', This
definition, among other things, converts truancy from a delinquent
act to an act of a "deprived child."3 2 The creative legislation had
been circumvented by lawyers and judges. Illustrative is Garner
Appeal, 3 where a girl not only failed to go to school, which classified
her as "deprived," but also failed to listen to her parents' direction
that she go to school, which made her "delinquent," not for truancy,
but for habitual disobedience to the reasonable and lawful commands of her parents. Thus, the intent of the legislators in adopting
only a limited inclusion of status offenses seemed to have been
subverted. However, the legislators have had the last word. The Act
of August 3, 1977 has entirely deleted "status" offenses, that is
ungovernability, from the definition of a delinquent act in section 2
of the 1972 Act.3 4 Now a juvenile cannot be found delinquent unless
he has committed a misdemeanor or felony.
2.

Murder

Although murder was specifically excluded from the definition of
"delinquent act ' 35 by section 2(2) of the Juvenile Act of 1972,31
juvenile courts still try murder cases by calling them "unlawful
31. See note 24 supra. Under prior law, delinquency included such conduct as waywardness, habitual disobedience, truancy, and behavior in a manner injurious to, or endangering,
the morals, health, or general welfare of the juvenile or others. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311,
§ 1, 1933 Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972). But see text accompanying note 34 infra.
32. The 1972 Act includes in its definition of a deprived child "a child who . . . while
subject to compulsory school attendence is habitually and without justification truant from
school." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(4)(v) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). The 1977 amendments change the designation of "deprived" to "dependent." See note 21 and accompanying
text of the Addendum.
33. 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 476, 326 A.2d 581 (1974).
34. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws __,
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
50-102(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See note 24 supra.
35. See Klein, supra note 2, at 199.
36. See note 24 supra.
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killings." In addition, the adult court has discretion to transfer hom7
icide cases back to juvenile court under section 7 of the 1972 Act.1
An unclear issue regarding this section has recently been raised
by a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision: does the juvenile court
have jurisdiction to try crimes ancillary to a murder, such as robbery and conspiracy? This issue arose in Commonwealth v. Keefer,3s
where the defendant was charged with murder in adult court and
was charged for robbery and conspiracy in juvenile court. A transfer
hearing was held and the entire case was removed to adult court.
The defendant complained that he should not have had the juvenile
charges transferred to adult court because it was not established
that he was not amenable to juvenile rehabilitation in accordance
with section 28(a)(4) of the Juvenile Act.39 This argument had some
significance since eventually he was not convicted of murder, but
rather of voluntary manslaughter, robbery, and conspiracy, and was
sentenced to five to twenty years at a state correctional institution
for the robbery and five to ten years concurrent time on the conspiracy and manslaughter bills.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision and held that the robbery and conspiracy charges should have
been heard in adult court. What is not clear is whether the court is
saying that when robbery and conspiracy are part of the murder
charge, there is no jurisdiction in the juvenile court, or that at the
transfer hearing the juvenile judge should automatically transfer
the case. The court specifically stated: "In this situation, the hearing judge was correct in transferring the underlying felonies to the
criminal side of the court of common pleas."4 This would indicate
that there should be a transfer hearing for the other charges. However, the court also said that the defendant's argument
hinges on the erroneous assumption that the juvenile division
in this case had jurisdiction over the robbery and conspiracy
charges. The argument ignores the fact that he was charged not
merely with robbery and conspiracy, but with murder as well.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-303 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See text accompanying
notes 65-70 infra.
38. 367 A.2d 1082 (Pa. 1976).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See note 52 infra for
the text of the provision.
40. 367 A.2d at 1085.
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• . .The robbery and conspiracy charges here involved, although initially brought in the juvenile division, were the underlying felonies of the felony murder charge simultaneously
41
initiated in the criminal division.
The supreme court referred to Commonwealth v. Campanal2 and
Commonwealth v. Tarver," as well as the crimes code," for the
proposition that all crimes arising out of the same episode should
be tried together in the interest of fairness to the defendant and for
economy of judicial resources. The court declared that given these
developments, it would be anomalous to mandate a different result
with respect to a juvenile charged with felony murder.".
The court's decision-to require the making of all charges connected with the homicide charge at the same time, and to have them
tried together in adult court-seems appropriate. That is the practice in Philadelphia County.4 In terms of the requirements of the
1972 Juvenile Act, it does not seem that after Keefer there is any
requirement to hold a transfer hearing; the transferral is automatic.
The defendant would always have the option to request that the
entire case be transferred back to juvenile court under section 7 of
the Act, and could also ask, under the same section, that disposition
be made by the juvenile judge if the juvenile offender is convicted
of a crime less than murder in adult court. 47
3.

Need for Treatment, Rehabilitation,and Supervision

Although section 23(b) of the Act provides that a case should be
dismissed if a child is not in need of "treatment, supervision or
rehabilitation,"48 the broad language of the statute can always be
used by the courts to find some justification for this conclusion.4
Although some courts do not even go through the motions of making
41. Id. at 1084.
42. 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand,
455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
43. 357 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1976).
44. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 110 (Purdon 1973).
45. 367 A.2d at 1085.
46. Interview with Joseph Murray, Chief, Homicide Unit, Office of the District Attorney
of Philadelphia County (Feb. 22, 1977).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-303 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
48. Id. § 50-320(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
49. Klein, supra note 2, at 200-01.
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a finding, 0 defense counsel have not yet decided to test-this determination in the appellate courts, probably because they deem it a
futile gesture.
4.

Transfer to Adult Court

The 1972 Juvenile Act purported to establish more stringent standards for transferring juveniles to criminal court. Before a juvenile
can be transferred to adult court, several requirements must be met:
(1) he must not be amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities; (2) he should not
require treatment for mental retardation or disease; and (3) the
crime must involve a sentence greater than three years or the community interest must call for placing the juvenile under legal restraint or discipline. The Act of August 3, 1977 has changed the 1972
Act by providing that a juvenile can be transferred to-adult court
only if he is charged with an act that constitutes a felony." Additionally, an elaborate procedure must be followed. 5 A question
50. See Packel, supra note 20, at 59.
51. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws _.;
see Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's
No. 1201, § 28 (July 3, 1977).
52. Section 28 of the Juvenile Act sets forth the following standards for guidance in
determining when a juvenile shall be transferred to a criminal court for trial:
(a) After a petition has been filed alleging delinquency based on conduct which is
designated a crime or public offense under the laws, including local ordinances, of this.
State, the court before hearing the petition on its merits may rule that this act is not
applicable and that the offense should be prosecuted, and transfer the offense, where
appropriate, to the trial or criminal division or to a judge of the court assigned to
conduct criminal proceedings, for the prosecution of the offense if:
(1) The child was fourteen or more years of age at the time of the alleged conduct;
and
(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity with
this act; and
(3) Notice in writing of the time, place and purpose of the hearing is given to the
child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days before the
hearing; and
(4) The court finds that there is a prima facie case that the child committed the
delinquent act alleged, and the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that: (i) the child is not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a
juvenile through available facilities, in determining this the court may consider age,
mental capacity, maturity, previous record and probation or institutional reports; and
(ii) the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally
ill, and (iii) the interests of the community require that the child be placed under ligal
restraint or discipline or that the offense is one which would carry a sentence of more
than three years if committed as an adult.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a)(1)-(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). Subsection 4 was
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raised in the 1973 article was whether the new standards in the 1972
Act were actually any less flexible than the former rules; it was
anticipated that they would not be.5" A representative case,
Commonwealth v. Greiner,54 indicates that a majority of the superior court supports a flexible attitude toward the requirements. At
the same time, however, a minority of the court, supported by wellreasoned dissents, lobbies for stricter adherence to the standards.
Greiner, a fifteen year-old, went along with his brother and a
friend to kidnap the victim's son. After accidentally confronting the
victim, the boys attempted to rob and kidnap him, and a codefendant of Greiner (later committed to an institution for the criminally
insane) stabbed the victim many times. The boys promptly turned
themselves in to the police and the appellant confessed. The only
evidence on the record other than facts as to the crime was the
statement of a probation officer who had conducted an investigation
of Greiner's background. The report found that Greiner was "in
need of some firm form of rehabilitation" and the probation officer
said that the boy could be better rehabilitated through the juvenile
system than in an adult prison.5 The officer also stated the defendant came from a good family, was a good student, had never been
in disciplinary difficulty, and had no prior juvenile record."
A four-judge majority of the superior court affirmed the certification of the defendant to adult court by the juvenile court. The court
held that a transfer should not be set aside absent a showing of gross
abuse of the broad discretion of the hearing judge.57 Also, the court
declared that "[t]he recent case of Commonwealth v. Pyle . . .
supports our conclusion that the lower court properly certified appellant to criminal court." 58 But the carefully drawn distinction of
the difference in the burden of proof between transfers to adult court
amended by the 1977 Act to read: "The court finds that there is a prima facie case that the
child committed the delinquent act alleged, and that the delinquent act would be considered
See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 28(4)
a felony if committed by an adult.
(July 13, 1977).
53. Klein, supra note 2, at 203.
54. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 289, 344 A.2d 915 (1975). See notes 1-8 and accompanying text of
the Addendum.
55. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. at 296, 344 A.2d at 918.
56. Id. at 301; 344 A.2d at 921.
57. Id. at 297, 344 A.2d at 919.
58. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Pyle, 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975). See text accompanying notes 66-70 infra.
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from juvenile court and transfers from adult court to juvenile court
set forth in Pyle may make reliance of the court upon Pyle unjustified."
The dissenting opinion in Greiner by Judge Hoffman, as well as
the separate dissenting and concurring opinion by Judge Spaeth,
seem much more persuasive than the majority opinion. Judge Hoffman argued that a remand was necessary in order to obtain a statement of the reasons for the juvenile court's decision. He noted that
Kent v. United States required that a juvenile court "must set forth
the basis of the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.""0 Judge Hoffman stated that the juvenile court's recitation of a "fact" that the juvenile was not amenable to treatment did
not show that the question received the careful consideration mandated by Kent."'
Judge Spaeth felt that a remand was necessary since the lower
court refused to hear a clinical psychologist's report, even though
both the Commonwealth and the juvenile defendant's counsel
agreed to place it in the record. Without the report and more specific
findings of fact, Judge Spaeth concluded, it would be practically
impossible to appraise the juvenile court's determinations that the
defendant was not amenable to treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation." However, Judge Spaeth added that until a determination
was made as to whether the transfer to adult court was improper,
the adult conviction should not be disturbed.6 3
The Greiner case raises the implication that the majority's interpretation of the statutory requirements for transfer to adult court
may be too flexible. Greiner's case was certified to adult court even
though he was not the principal who caused the injuries and had no
prior record of offenses. Moreover, a psychological report was ignored. If Greiner's trial could be transferred under these circumstances, it seems that almost any defendant's case can be certified,
provided the crime of which he is accused is sufficiently severe. 4
59. See 236 Pa. Super. Ct. at 308 n.ll, 344 A.2d at 925 n.11 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
See also text accompanying notes 38-45 supra and notes 105-107 infra.
60. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. at 304, 344 A.2d at 923, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 561 (1966).
61. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. at 307, 344 A.2d at 924.
62. Id. at 309, 344 A.2d at 925 (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting).
63. Id.
64. In April 1977, Greinerwas argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; no decision
has been rendered. Commonwealth v. Bey, No. 76-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977) fur-
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This renders virtually meaningless the provision that the Commonwealth must disprove the child's amenability to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.
5.

Transfer from Adult Court to Juvenile Court

Section 7 of the 1972 Act, which contains the mandate to transfer
back to juvenile court those defendants being tried in adult court
who turn out to be juveniles, also provides: "If it appears to the
court in a criminal proceeding charging murder, that the defendant
is a child, the case may similarly be transferred [to juvenile court]
and the provisions of this act applied." 5 However, the 1972 Act does
not provide guidelines for determining when a murder case must be
transferred to juvenile court for trial as a delinquent act. This problem was considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Pyle.'l
In Pyle, the appellant, a seventeen year-old boy, was charged
with the shooting death of his father. A rule to show cause why the
case should not be transferred to juvenile court was filed by the
appellant's counsel. At a hearing on the issue, the lower court discharged the rule and the case was conducted as a criminal proceeding in adult court. On appeal, the supreme court noted that the new
Juvenile Act did not provide standards for determining when transfer of murder cases to juvenile court was in order. The court held
that although the standards to be applied under section 28(a) of the
Act 7 when considering a transfer from juvenile court to the adult
system should be considered, the burden of proof is not the same.
Whereas the Commonwealth must prove that the child is not amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation as a juvenile in
order to effectuate a transfer from juvenile court to adult court, the
supreme court held that once a prima facie case of murder was
established, it was not necessary to make this "negative inquiry."'"
Because of the heinous nature of the crime, the court stated, "it is
the youth who must prove that he belongs in the juvenile setting by
showing his need and amenability to the 'program of supervision,
ther muddies the waters in this area. See discussion at notes 1-8 and accompanying text of
the Addendum.
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-303 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
66. 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975).
67. See note 52 supra.
68. 462 Pa. at 622, 342 A.2d at 106.
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care and rehabilitation' which he would receive as a juvenile.""
Because it was determined Pyle had deep-seated problems, was
dangerous, and might need treatment beyond his minority, the
court upheld the hearing judge's decision to deny the motion to
transfer to juvenile court. 0
D. Juvenile Hearings: Guarantee of Basic Rights
1. Corpus Delicti
Section 21 of the Juvenile Act of 197211 spelled out some of the
constitutional safeguards guaranteed juveniles." A question that
was still in issue in 1973 revolved around language in section 21(b)
providing: "A confession validly made by a child out of court at a
time when the child is under eighteen years of age shall be insufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency unless it is corroborated by other evidence. 7'

3

Defense counsel took the position that a

juvenile cannot be convicted if the only indication of his criminal
participation is his statement, even if the crime itself is proven
independently. Prosecutors read this section to merely restate and
apply to juveniles the corpus delicti principle that a confession is
insufficient unless there is independent evidence that a crime has
been committed. This writer agreed with the latter position," and
the view was adopted by the superior court in Anderson Appeal. '5
In Anderson, the defendant, a member of a street gang, was taken
into custody by the police at 9 p.m. as a suspect in a shooting. At
the police station, the defendant was given his Miranda warnings
and was questioned for about 15 minutes. At 11 p.m., the defendant
was questioned again about the shooting; thereupon, he signed a
typed confession. On appeal, the superior court affirmed the admis69. Id. at 622-23, 342 A.2d at 106.
70. Id. at 623-24, 342 A.2d at 107.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
72. The United States Supreme Court has broadly delineated the constitutional rights of
juveniles in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), determining that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required in a juvenile proceeding where a juvenile is subject to possible confinement,
and in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where it decided that most constitutional guarantees
associated with traditional criminal prosecutions are applicable to a juvenile proceeding. But
see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial not required in juvenile proceeding).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
74. Klein, supra note 2, at 214.
75. 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 439, 313 A.2d 260 (1973).
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sibility of the confession. In response to the defendant's argument
that the 1972 Act required more than that the corpus delicti be
established before the juvenile confession could be admitted, the
court stated: "the new juvenile law merely codified certain legal
principles into juvenile proceedings so that these principles, including proof of the corpus delicti, apply equally to juvenile and adult
proceedings." 7 6 Thus, the lower court's determination was upheld,
and the corpus delicti position was sanctioned by the superior court.
2.

Futch-Tingle Implications

Anderson Appeal also refused to broaden the Futch-Tingle imbroglio by ingrafting upon it provisions of the Juvenile Act. The line
of cases stemming from Commonwealth v. Futch7 7 and
Commonwealth v. Tingle7" make violation of the Pennsylvania rule
of criminal procedure requiring a defendant to be taken to the proper issuing authority for a preliminary arraignment without unnecessary delay an automatic ground to suppress any statement given
during the period of unnecessary delay. Section 13(a)(3) of the 1972
Juvenile Act possesses a more rigid timeliness requirement: "A person taking a child into custody, with all reasonable speed . . . shall
• . . [b]ring the child before the court or deliver him to a detention
or shelter care facility. . . . " The question arose whether a statement taken before a child reached a "detention or shelter care facility" had to be suppressed. This issue had great practical implications since traditionally the first stop for an arrested juvenile is the
local police station. In many jurisdictions, this benefits the juvenile;
his case may be adjusted at that level.8 0 But often there is a delay
of several hours at the police station before a juvenile officer arrives
to interview the juvenile and later transports him to the detention
center.
In Anderson Appeal, the superior court held that only the time
limits set forth in the Futch-Tingle cases need be met and that the
Juvenile Act did not create any greater rights.8 In reaching this
76. Id. at 444, 313 A.2d at 262.
77. 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
78. 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973).
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-310(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
80. See Packel, supra note 20, at 25-28.
81. But see notes 9-18 and accompanying text of the Addendum.
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decision, the court specifically adopted the following language of the
lower court opinion:
[T]he provisions of the new Juvenile Act relied upon by the
defense in arguing the inadmissibility of the confession, are not
a separate and supplementary set of guidelines to be followed
by the court in seeing to it that justice prevails in the instance
of juveniles. Rather, they represent a codification of those standards of justice and fairness, and guarantees of fundamental
rights based upon pertinent constitutional principles of due
process, which, already, have been enunciated in existing case
law.12
Thus, as with the corpus delicti issue, the juvenile gained no additional rights under the new Juvenile Act. The timeliness standard,
upon which was based the admissibility of a juvenile's statement,
remained unaffected.
During the final preparation of this article, two decisions were
handed down by Pennsylvania courts which amplify this issue. A
general rule with respect to pre-arraignment delay was fixed in
Commonwealth v. Davenport,8 in which the supreme court both
fixed an absolute six-hour cut-off for the preliminary arraignment,
and provided that statements taken promptly still are to be suppressed if the arraignment is delayed, abrogating the requirement
of a nexus between the delay and the statement that is the law of
federal courts and other jurisdictions in the country. The relationship between juvenile proceedings and the adult rule requiring immediate preliminary arraignments was discussed by the superior
court in Commonwealth v. Bey, 4 in which the court held that rule
1(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 85 does not
preclude application of the rules to juvenile proceedings and that
rule 13016 applies to juveniles until a juvenile petition is filed against
them.
82. 227 Pa. Super. Ct. at 442, 313 A.2d at 261.
83. 370 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1977).
84. No. 76-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977). See discussion at notes 9-18 and accompanying text of the Addendum.
85. PA. R. CRiM. P. 1(a) provides: "These rules shall govern criminal proceedings in all
courts including courts not of record. Unless otherwise specifically provided, these rules shall
not apply to juvenile ..
proceedings." See notes 15-18 and accompanying text of the Addendum.
86. PA. R. CiuM. P. 130 states that "[wihen a defendant has been arrested without a
warrant in a court case, he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing
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Suppression of Confessions, Evidence, and Identifications

As noted earlier, section 21 of the Juvenile Act of 1972 merely
provides that the general law applicable to suppression of confessions, evidence, and identifications applies to juvenile hearings as
well as adult trials. There have been a number of cases in the past
several years dealing with the issue of when a juvenile can waive his
Miranda rights without the presence of a parent or other adult.
Although these cases generally involve homicides committed by
those under the age of eighteen,87 they do not involve an interpretation of the Juvenile Act, but rather a consideration of general rules
of voluntariness of waiver of rights; as such they are beyond the
scope of this article. The reader is referred to Judge Hoffman's
opinion in Ruth Appeal,18 which points out that there is confusion
as to whether a statement given by a juvenile without interested
adult guidance is per se inadmissible.
4.

Use of Juvenile Record to Impeach Witness

Section 27 of the 1972 Act provides that an adjudication of delinquency is not a criminal conviction and may not be used against the
juvenile in any other court, with certain limited exceptions." Sections 37 and 38 of the Act provide for the privacy of juvenile records. 0 The Act specifically states that juvenile records cannot be
used to impeach a juvenile (or a former juvenile delinquent who has
become an adult) who testifies as a witness for the Commonwealth
in a criminal prosecution of someone else. However, in Davis v.
Alaska,"' the United States Supreme Court held that Alaska's policy
in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile's records must yield
to the sixth amendment right to confrontation. The Court reversed
Davis' conviction because he was precluded from showing that a
juvenile witness against him was on juvenile probation and might
authority where a complaint shall be filed against him and he shall be given an immediate
preliminary arraignment."
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975); Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975); Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389,
329 A.2d 286 (1974); Ruth Appeal, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 453, 360 A.2d 922 (1976). See generally
Packel, supra note 20, at 41-46.
88. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 453, 456-57 n.3, 360 A.2d 922, 924 n.3 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 761 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-324 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
90. Id. §§ 50-334, -335.
91. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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have been biased. A stolen safe was found near the juvenile's home,
and he later identified Davis. The defense wanted to use the record
of juvenile probation to show bias, alleging that the juvenile acted
out of concern for jeopardy of his probation and undue pressure from
the police in making the identification.
The defense counsel raised the identical issue in Pennsylvania in
Commonwealth v. Pilosky,92 when it was claimed that defendants
were prejudiced by an inability to cross-examine the prosecutrix
concerning her juvenile record in a rape case. Despite reliance by the
defense on Davis in their brief, the superior court rejected the claim
solely on the basis of section 27 of the Juvenile Act without even
mentioning Davis. The supreme court refused allocatur
It is troubling that the appellate courts have apparently ignored
a United States Supreme Court decision which seems to invalidate
a statutory provision. Conceivably, if the court had discussed Davis,
it could have distinguished it. Davis made it clear that the juvenile
record was not being introduced as a general impeachment of the
witness as a truthful person, but instead was being used to show bias
and prejudice. 4 Thus, it can be argued only certain fundamental
uses of the juvenile record rise to sixth amendment proportions to
defeat the Commonwealth's provision limiting the use of juvenile
records. In Pilosky, the juvenile record was being introduced to show
a pattern of conduct indicating a reputation for lack of chastity,95
in reliance on the approach authorized in Commonwealth v.
Eberhardt"and Commonwealth v. Dulacy.91 In Pilosky itself and in
another case decided the same day, Commonwealth v. Crider,9" the
principles supporting Eberhardtand Dulacy were overruled by the
superior court. Since the refusal to admit the juvenile record in
Pilosky therefore could have been supported on the grounds that the
contents of the record were irrelevant, it should not have been supported by mere recitation of section 27 of the Juvenile Act.
92. 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 233, 362 A.2d 253 (1976).
93. Allocatur was denied on October 18, 1976. Cf. Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa.
461, 309 A.2d 591 (1973) (defense witness in a criminal case cannot be cross-examined on
juvenile record).
94. 415 U.S. at 311.
95. See Brief for Appellants at 12-13, Commonwealth v. Pilosky, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 233,
362 A.2d 253 (1976).
96. 164 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 67 A.2d 613 (1949).
97. 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 475, 205 A.2d 706 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965).
98. 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 361 A.2d 352 (1976), noted in 15 DuQ. L. REv. 155 (1976).
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5.

Procedurefor Suppressions

Although the Juvenile Act codifies the United States Supreme
Court's mandate to provide basic constitutional rights to juveniles,
it does not spell out procedures for the enforcement of these rights.
The superior court focused on this problem in a footnote in
Stoutzenberger Appeal."0 In Stoutzenberger, the court pointed out
that the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to juvenile proceedings.10 The court then concluded that it was
not necessary to file pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, identifications, or confessions'"' because section 21(b) of the Juvenile Act
merely provides that constitutionally impermissible evidence shall
not be received "over objection."' 12 However, it is still the usual
practice to hear motions to suppress prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Defense counsel will make this request because it preserves the
right to request that the case-in-chief be heard before a different
judge if prejudicial, nonadmissible evidence is adduced at the suppression hearing. 03 As a courtesy, it is also common for defense
counsel to provide written or other advance notification that a suppression issue is to be litigated.0 4
6.

Double Jeopardy

In Commonwealth v. Jones,"i a case recently decided by the
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, the court found that
double jeopardy prevented trial in adult court where a judge began
to hear evidence at an adjudicatory hearing before transferring the
case to adult court. In 1975, the United States Supreme Court in
Breed v. Jones' held that trial in the juvenile court does constitute
risk for the purpose of the double jeopardy clause. The Court re99. 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 500, 503 n.2, 344 A.2d 668, 670 n.2 (1975).
100. Id. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1(a). But see Commonwealth v. Bey, No. 76-42 (Pa. Super.
Ct. June 29, 1977); discussion at notes 9-18 and accompanying text of the Addendum.
101. 235 Pa. Super. Ct. at 503, 344 A.2d at 670.
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
103. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 369 A.2d 809 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976), where the majority
of the court did not reach the issue of whether the judge should have recused himself after
hearing a motion to suppress because of trial errors. Judge Spaeth concurred in the result
but said he would not reach the issue of the trial errors because he thought the judge should
have recused himself after hearing the motion. 369 A.2d at 815 (concurring opinion).
104. See Packel, supra note 20, at 40.
105. No. 76-2093 (Pa. C.P. Dauph. Co. March 21, 1977).
106. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
107. See note 71 supra.
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jected the argument that juvenile proceedings were different than
criminal trials, citing In re Gault.0 1 The position in Commonwealth
v. Jones seems consistent with Breed v. Jones. There must be care
taken to see that transfer hearings are truly transfer hearings. A
court should not on its own motion, or even upon a belated motion
by the assistant district attorney, decide after the adjudicatory
hearing has proceeded that a case is too severe-then nunc pro tunc
make the transfer.
E.
1.

Dispositions

"Camp Hill" Question

By 1973, one of the few issues that had reached the superior court
involving the 1972 Juvenile Act was the so-called Camp Hill question. 08 For many years prior to the Act, delinquent juveniles had
been committed to the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill,
a maximum security facility that had been used both for juveniles
and young adults convicted in adult court. The superior court, in
Commonwealth ex rel. Parker v. Patton, °9 interpreted section 27 of
the Juvenile Act"0 to permit commitments to Camp Hill so long as
juveniles would be separated from adults for all activities. This
position was reaffirmed by the superior court in Commonwealth ex
rel. Peterson v. Patton."' The court said that although segregation
of adult and juvenile offenders was mandated, the Commonwealth's
obligation was to comply with the segregation order, not to release
the juveniles."' This rationale is logical, yet whether the court resolved the cases properly is unclear. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not addressed this issue. However, by letter in 1975, the
Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Robert P. Kane, notified both
the Superintendent of Camp Hill and the juvenile court judges of
the Commonwealth of his doubt that commitment of juveniles to
Camp Hill is lawful and stated that the Department of Justice
would resist the placement of any juvenile in Camp Hill after August 15, 1975."1 This directive has been obeyed. The result has been
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See also note 71 supra.
Klein, supra note 2, at 218-20.
225 Pa. Super. Ct. 217, 310 A.2d 414 (1973).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-324(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
230 Pa. Super. Ct. 6, 326 A.2d 444 (1974).
Id. at 7, 326 A.2d at 445.
See Haas Appeal, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 428-29 n.2, 339 A.2d 98, 101 n.2 (1975).
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additional transfers of juveniles to adult court and the opening of
two more secure units, one on the campus of the Youth Development Center at Cornwells Heights, another at New Castle."'
In Haas Appeal,"' a juvenile court judge in Allegheny County
interpreted Commonwealth ex rel. Parkerv. Pattonto authorize the
commitment of a sixteen year-old girl to the state's adult prison for
women, the State Correctional Institution at Muncy. He directed
Muncy to provide a separate facility for this one girl, who had run
away from other institutions. The superior court reversed the lower
court and held that the commitment was unlawful. It was noted by
the court that since the girl would be the only juvenile at the institution, she would have to be placed in the hospital ward, a situation
nearly amounting to solitary confinement." 8 The court further
pointed out that Muncy, unlike Camp Hill, is not "an institution
operated by the Department of Public Welfare or special facility for
children operated by the Department of Justice" which was contemplated by section 25 of the Juvenile Act." 7 The court added that
there were other appropriate facilities available; Muncy was not an
appropriate facility."'
Although the Commonwealth is beginning to eliminate inappropriate commitments of juveniles to adult facilities, it is a long way
from providing adequate facilities for those juveniles who need a
secure setting.
2.

ProhibitionAgainst Fines

• A question not anticipated at the time this author wrote in 1973
was raised in the case of In re Gardini."' A judge in Blair County
imposed a fine of $200 on a juvenile who pleaded guilty to burglary.
114. Interview with Stanley M. Hopson, Deputy Administrator for the Juvenile Branch
of the Family Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Feb.
24, 1977). One juvenile who was committed to Camp Hill three years ago remains there. As
of June 30, 1977, 55 residents of Camp Hill were below the age of 18; they passed through
adult court. Interview with Ernest S. Patton, Superintendent of Camp Hill (Aug. 15, 1977).
Since the number of juveniles detained there as of June 30, 1975 was 468, it appears that the
Juvenile Act of 1972 and the order of the Attorney General have had a major effect, even if
there has been some increase in transfers to adult court.
115. 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 339 A.2d 98 (1975).
116. Id. at 432, 339 A.2d at 103.
117. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-322(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
118. 234 Pa. Super. Ct. at 431, 339 A.2d at 102-03.
119. 365 A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
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The public defender appealed and a unanimous superior court vacated the fine. The court pointed out that the possible dispositions
of a case involving a delinquent child were spelled out in section 25
of the Juvenile Act' 0 and that fines were not included as an alternative. Rejecting the Commonwealth's argument that the use of the
word "may" in section 25 somehow removed the limitation, the
court held that the section clearly restricted the discretion of the
trial court to choosing the most appropriate of the four listed dispositions (which did not include fines).' Moreover, the court referred
to the general provisions of the Act,'22 which state that punishment1 3
is not an included goal, and held that the fine was a punishment.
The 1977 amendments have made the issue moot, since a provision
has been included Which allows the ordering of fines, costs or restitution.' 4
F.

Post-TrialMotions

It was noted in the 1973 article that there is no provision in the
1972 Juvenile Act for the filing of post-trial motions in arrest of
judgment or for a new trial. It was thought that in any event, it is
better practice to file them. 5' In a concurring and dissenting opinion
in Gillen Appeal, Judge Spaeth noted this situation, and indicated
that the failure to formally file post-trial motions should not constitute a waiver of any arguments not specifically communicated to
the lower court.'2 6 However, with the trend in Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions of considering anything not specifically
raised in the court below as waived,'27 it seems even more important
today to be cautious and to file detailed post-trial motions. Another
viewpoint is not to file written motions since then it cannot be said
that anything left out was waived. It is hoped that the absence of a
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-322 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
121. 365 A.2d at 1253.
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
123. 365 A.2d at 1253. See also In re Evans, 371 A.2d 914 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (imposition
of restitution and court costs on juvenile prohibited).
124. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -,
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
50-322 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 25(5) (July
13, 1977).
125. Klein, supra note 2, at 220-21.
126. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 521, 529, 344 A.2d 706, 710 (1975).
127. See Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 296 A.2d 741 (1972); see also Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974).
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statutory requirement for post-trial motions would obviate any
mandate to file them, but this hope is not a guarantee.
III.

CONCLUSION

Upon investigation of any new legislation, after several years of
application and judicial interpretation, one often discovers that it
has not engendered as much change or confusion as had been anticipated, it is not as bad as its critics had forecasted, nor as much of a
solution as its proponents had predicted. Certainly, there is no such
thing as "The Law." Legislation changes as times and attitudes
change, and is much affected by outside influences and political
shifts. It is a reality that the refinement of a new act, by the courts
or by the legislature, takes a long time, and it will probably be
several more years before all the kinks and unanswered questions
concerning the Juvenile Act of 1972 are resolved. Moreover, other
changes in the 1972 Act, in the legislative proposal stage at the time
of the writing of this article, have now been enacted, making it even
more difficult to decipher Pennsylvania's juvenile law.
IV.

ADDENDUM

In an attempt to present as clear a picture of the existing law as
possible, this writer has wrestled with the major revisions of the 1972
Act which were recently passed by the Pennsylvania legislature and
signed into law by the governor on August 3, 1977. In addition, the
superior court has handed down a case of major import concerning
several provisions of the Act which deserves attention. Although
practicalities of time and space preclude extensive treatment of
these new developments, this addendum serves to highlight changes
and will hopefully preclude the need for an immediate updated
article, "The Juvenile Act of 1972 Re-Revisited."
A.

Commonwealth v. Bey

In Commonwealth v. Bey, I filed on June 29, 1977, the superior
court dealt with two separate issues. First, the court held that a
juvenile case's transfer to adult court was not accompanied by a
sufficient statement of facts by the trial judge to determine whether
1.

No. 76-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977).
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or not the certification was proper. Second, the court held that the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to juveniles until
the mechanism of the juvenile process has begun, raising FutchTingle-Davenport problems for juveniles from the time of arrest to
the time of juvenile processing.
The superior court agreed with appellant's contentions that the
certification was improper since the court had failed to specifically
report its reasons for the certification, and further, the lower court
failed to illustrate that it had made a full investigation of the matter
and had carefully considered the certification question.2 The superior court held that a meaningful review was therefore impossible.
Bey had been charged with accosting a twelve year-old girl in a
vacant lot and committing various acts of rape and involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse upon her. The case was continued for the
production of psychological and psychiatric reports. After reference
to them and a discussion of appellant's past record, the juvenile
court judge decided to certify the case, concluding that the juvenile
court system was not adequate to handle this defendant and his
behavior.
The superior court held this conclusion insufficient and remanded
for a rather strange type of certification hearing. There was to be a
new hearing, but the court specifically said: "The evidence introduced at this hearing is to be limited solely to the evidence introduced at the initial certification hearing." 3 A major question raised
by the superior court's decision is whether the trial judge must
merely make a statement of facts, or whether the psychological and
psychiatric reports obviously reviewed and considered by the judge
can be made part of the record for purposes of this statement.
Judge Price, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Bey,
pointed out that this case cannot logically stand side-by-side with
Commonwealth v. Greiner.4 This writer agrees with Judge Price that
there is little difference between the Greinertrial judge merely reciting the provisions of the act in stating that the defendant "is not
amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation through available facilities for juveniles"5 and the Bey trial judge saying that "the
2. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
3. Id. at 16.
4. Id. at 5 & n.ll (separate concurring and dissenting opinion). See 236 Pa. Super. Ct.
289, 344 A.2d 915 (1975); notes 54-64 supra.
5. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. at 302, 344 A.2d at 922.
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Juvenile Court system is not an adequate setup to handle this defendant and his behavior."'
Upon reviewing Judge Price's opinion, which discusses the facts
before the trial court in Bey, it appears that Bey is a much better
candidate for certification than Greiner.7 Greiner was a participant
in the robbery but was not himself the stabber. He had a good
family background and academic record with no prior difficulties in
school or with the law. A psychological report, presumably favorable, was kept out of the record by the trial judge. In contrast, Bey
himself was the actor in a vicious sexual attack on a twelve yearold girl. He had previously been adjudicated delinquent for rape and
robbery-related offenses. The psychiatric and sociological reports
indicated aggressiveness and hostility and poor mental discipline.
Although a fuller statement of facts would have been preferable,
there does not appear to have been any request made to the trial
judge for such a statement by defense counsel; this could be considered a waiver. On the basis of what the superior court actually knew,
it appears that Greiner's certification should have been overturned
and Bey's allowed to stand, rather than the reverse.'
The second key portion of the Bey decision relates to a lineup held
at the police district before the juvenile arrived at a juvenile detention facility for processing. The court held that the lineup was held
during a period of "unnecessary delay" as outlined by rule 130 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Futch-Tingle-Davenport
cases, and determined that the Rules of Criminal Procedure do
apply to juvenile cases.' The court then went on to say that the
admission of the out-of-court lineup identification was harmless
error because there was evidence showing lack of taint for the incourt identification. 0
This writer agrees with both Judges Cercone and Hoffman, who
disagree with the majority on this issue." Judge Cercone notes that
the defendant was represented by counsel at the lineup. It was
6. No. 76-42, slip. op. at 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977).
7. Compare No. 76-42, slip. op. at 5-8 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977), with 236 Pa. Super.
Ct. at 298-303, 344 A.2d at 919-22.
8. As has been noted, Greiner has been argued before the supreme court, and the opinion
in that case may make the entire discussion obsolete by the time this article appears in print.
9. No. 76-42, slip op. at 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977). See notes 77-86 and accompanying text supra.
10. No. 76, slip op. at 14-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977).
11. Id. at 3-4 (Hoffman, J., concurring and dissenting) (separate opinion); id. at 1 (Cercone, J., concurring) (separate opinion).
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pointed out by the majority that counsel even took steps to ensure
that the lineup was not suggestive. Judge Cercone cites Commonwealth v. Corbett2 for the proposition that, unlike Futch, this defendant had a lawyer and would not have been in any better position
even if he had had a prompt arraignment.
It is noted that the supreme court in Commonwealth v.
Davenport" appears to have abrogated any need to show a nexus
between the delay and the statement or lineup; such banning of all
statements and lineups is merely punishment of the Commonwealth
for failing to have a prompt arraignment. Hopefully, this can be
limited to statements, and prompt lineups can be used even if the
arraignment is subsequently delayed.
Judge Hoffman correctly pointed out in his opinion that if lineup
identification is improper, it is hard to conceive how it could be
harmless error to admit it, particularly when young children are
involved and much of testimony related to the ease of identification
at the lineup. 4
In addition, the superior court in Bey appears to be unnecessarily
torturing the language of rule 1(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: "These rules shall govern criminal proceedings in all courts including courts not of record. Unless otherwise
specifically provided, these rules shall not apply to juvenile or domestic proceedings."'' 5 The majority of the superior court held that
the Rules of Criminal Procedure are in effect until something is done
to begin the juvenile process, such as arrival at the juvenile.detention facility and filing of a juvenile petition. The rationale of
Anderson Appeal" seems a much better approach. Since section 13
of the Juvenile Act of 197211 requires a juvenile to be taken with all
reasonable speed to a detention facility, the same standards-such
as the six-hour Davenport standard'8-should be applied by using
the Juvenile Act as would apply if the Rules of Criminal Procedure
were utilized; it is unnecessary to force a reading to apply rule 130.
12. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 292, 323 A.2d 836 (1974).
13. 370 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1977).
14. No. 76-42, slip. op. at 3-4 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 29, 1977) (separate concurring and
dissenting opinion).
15. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1(a) (emphasis added).
16. 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 439, 313 A.2d 260 (1973). See notes 77-82 and accompanying text
supra.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-310 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
18. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Act of August 3, 1977
The Act signed by Governor Shapp on August 3, 1977 has
amended the Juvenile Act of 1972 section by section, although most
of the changes have provided only minor modifications of the existing law rather than overhauling the philosophy and concept of the
1972 legislation. Section 2(2)'" has been amended to deal with a
problem discussed earlier in this article:"0 summary offenses are
excluded from the juvenile act but the amendment also excludes
traffic offenses. This writer believes that only traffic offenses should
have been excluded. The problem with the section before it was
amended was that it appeared that a magistrate or justice of the
peace could commit a juvenile to an adult jail for ninety days for a
summary offense, while the same juvenile convicted of robbery or
rape could not be incarcerated with adults. Rather than giving the
juvenile court jurisdiction over summary offenses, the new provisions have merely deprived a district magistrate, municipal court
judge, or traffic court judge of the power to imprison a juvenile.
The amendment of section 2(4) eliminated the word "deprived"
from the juvenile vernacular and substituted the word "dependent.""1 Hopefully, this change in terminology will be accompanied by a new approach to the treatment of such children. Another amendment to the definitional section, section 2(1), defining the term "child," would permit the retention of a deprived (now
"dependent") child in a treatment facility beyond the age of eighteen to the age of twenty-one, if he agrees. 2
Sections 2(2), (3), and (4) have been further modified by designating "status" offenders who merely habitually disobey their
parents as "dependent" rather than "delinquent." Also, a child
under the age of ten cannot be classified as a delinquent child, even
if he commits a delinquent act. 3 Section 8.1 has been amended to
19. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No.,41, 1977 Pa. Laws .,
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
50-102(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201 § 2(2) (July
13, 1977).
20. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
21. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -,
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
5-102(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 2(4) (July
13, 1977).
22. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -, amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
50-102(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 2(1) (July
13, 1977).
23. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws __,
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
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provide that a child can be discharged from consent decree probation in less than six months only with the approval of the court.24
The 1977 Act makes major changes in section 14 which involves
the place of pre-trial detention. It permits, until December 31, 1979,
the continuation of the detention of children with adults for a fiveday period if there is no appropriate facility available, but provides
for the inspection and approval of these facilities by the Department
of Public Welfare.25 The detention of children with adults is proscribed after December 31, 1979, and each county is to submit a
plan to the Department of Welfare for the removal of children from
adult facilities by December 31, 1978.26 The new Act mandates construction of shelter care or similar facilities for juvenile detention,
Counties
and encourages regional centers for the smaller counties.
2
construction.
this
for
$50,000
to
up
can be assessed
Section 18 has amplified the 1972 provision limiting pre-hearing
detention of a child to ten days by allowing a single ten-day continuance when the evidence is unavailable, could not be made available
by due diligence, and will be available within ten days. 8 Section 25
of the 1972 Act, dealing with dispositions, has been amended to at
least pay lip service to the "social work" philosophy, although it
does not appear that much practical change will result. The old rule
prohibiting institutionalization of children under twelve has been
restored. 29 It is now stated that the minimum confinement necessary
should be used, 30 although common sense would have dictated that
approach in the past. The courts can now impose fines, costs, or
restitution, if it is deemed part of the rehabilitation plan and is
consistent with the nature of the acts committed and the earning
50-102(2) to (4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
24. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -, amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
50-305(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 8.1(c)
13, 1977).
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -,
50-311(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 14(4)
13, 1977).
26. See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, §'14(B.1) (July 13, 1977).
27. See id. § 14(F). See also id. § 14.1.
28.

Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -,

11, §
(July
11, §
(July

amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §

50-315 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 18(A) (July
13, 1977).
29. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -,

amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §

50-322(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
30. See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 25(4) (July 13, 1977).
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capacity of the child. :" In addition, a unique feature has been added:
fines or restitution can be paid from the child's earnings from a
constructive work program, if this is acceptable to the victim."2 Philosophically, this raises an issue in an area not often discussed.
Whereas the amendment supports the view that a victim's rights
have not been adequately vindicated unless he is consulted before
the ultimate disposition of his victimizer is made, the traditional
view is that the goals of society should govern the determination and
that whether the victim is forgiving or vengeful should have little
to do with the ultimate decision as to the disposition of the offender.
Section 26 has been amended to provide for disposition review
hearings for committed juveniles every nine months rather than
twelve months. 3 Also, an institution may automatically transfer a
juvenile to a less secure facility, unless the court takes the positive
step of objecting within ten days of receipt of notice of the transfer
and then holds a full hearing.34 Although this gives more power to
the institutions, the judges still retain the final say. This appears
to be another development in the jousting between the Public Welfare Department and the judiciary.
The amendment to section 28 in essence provides that a juvenile
cannot be transferred unless his delinquent act is a felony.3 5 This
only reiterates section 28(a)(4)(iii) in the 1972 Act which requires
that the crime carry a sentence of more than three years or that the
community's needs dictate that the child be placed under legal
restraint.
Section 38 now provides for the public disclosure of records of
juveniles fourteen years or older who have been charged with second
offenses of the crimes of rape, kidnapping, murder, robbery, arson,
burglary, or other acts involving the use or threat of serious bodily

harm .31
31. See id. § 25(5).
32. See id. § 25(6).
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
33. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -,
50-323 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 26 (July 13,
1977).
34. See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 26(B) (July 13, 1977).
amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
35. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws __,
50-325(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 28(A)(4)
(July 13, 1977).
36. Act of Aug. 3, 1977, No. 41, 1977 Pa. Laws -, amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
50-335 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See Pa. Senate Bill 757, Printer's No. 1201, § 38(B)(1) (July
13, 1977).

